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Administration for Soviet Property in Austria
The Administration for Soviet Property in Austria, or the USIA ((ロシア語:Управление советским имуществом в Австрии)) was formed in the Soviet zone of Allied-occupied Austria in June 1946 and operated until the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1955. USIA operated as a de facto state corporation and controlled over four hundred expropriated Austrian factories, transportation and trading companies. USIA assets included formerly independent Austrian companies (ÖAF), factories once owned by German corporations (AEG) and former SS enterprises (DEST). At its peak in 1951 the conglomerate employed around 60 thousand people,〔Bishof et al., p. 75.〕 or 10% of Austrian industrial labor.〔Bader, p. 153.〕 USIA was exempt from Austrian tariffs, disregarded Austrian taxation, and could easily trade with Eastern Europe despite the Iron Curtain and Western trade embargoes. The extraterritorial corporation attempted to be self-sufficient and was very weakly integrated with the rest of Austrian economy.〔Bishof et al., p. 126.〕
==Establishment==
Occupation of Germany and Austria by the Soviet troops was followed by large-scale dismantling of former German equipment which was shipped to the Soviet Union as war reparations. Austria lost, in 1951 dollars, 200 million dollars' worth of German industrial properties (out of total 1.5 billion). Plunder continued until the early summer of 1946, when the Soviet policy changed from taking Austrian assets to managing them for a profit.〔Bischof et al., p. 74.〕 The Soviet Department for Investigation of German Properties compiled an inventory of remaining industrial assets in the Soviet zone (Lower Austria, Burgenland and eastern districts of Upper Austria). June 27, 1945 the Soviet command transformed this Department into the Administration for Soviet Property in Eastern Austria (USIVA) and placed all industrial assets under its control. In 1947 the name was shortened to USIA. Its internal structure mimicked that of the Soviet cabinet, with nine divisions paralleling nine ministries of industries.〔〔Bader, pp. 124-127, provides a step-by-step analysis of the events of 1946.〕 No less than eleven ministries in Moscow had a say in USIA affairs.〔Bischof et al., p. 79.〕
Only one-tenth of USIA assets were, indeed, German.〔Bischof et al. p. 76; Bader, p. 124.〕 Others were historically Austrian properties, expropriated with ludicrous explanations or with no explanations at all. Expropriation of lands of the House of Esterházy was "justified" because, according to the Soviets, the knighthood of the Holy Roman Empire conferred in 1806 qualified Esterházy as Germans rather than Austrians.〔 Austrian government was forced to accept the fact but refused to legalize the expropriations through records in land and corporate registers. The Soviets used this refusal as a pretext for not paying Austrian taxes.〔Bischof et al., pp.77-78.〕 Exact number of businesses under USIA control is subject to different interpretations. According to Austrian 1955 sources, there were 419 enterprises, of them 300 in the industry. A different source named 160 enterprises in 1954 (excluding the oil fields, transportation companies and trading outlets).〔 The Soviets also operated ''Soviet Military Bank'' (SMB) which evolved from the Red Army field treasury. It tried to obtain an Austrian banking license but the government denied it in fear of Soviet influence over Austrian finances.〔Bischog et al, p. 79.〕
The number of employees varied from 22 thousand in 1946 to a peak of 60 thousand in 1951 and down to 36 thousand in 1955.〔 A disproportionately high share of USIA staff were Austrian Communists, especially after the 1950 Austrian general strikes, when communists were fired ''en masse'' from non-USIA businesses.〔 The strikes of the 1950s were powered by organized pro-communist workers of the USIA factories in the Soviet sector of Vienna. The Soviets, however, placed business interests above "class unity" with Austrian Communists.〔Bader, p. 157.〕 According to Hugo Portisch, Soviet representatives in Austria were split over the 1950 strikes: some saw an opportunity to suppress the Western influence, while the USIA management had to meet production targets and opposed any disruption in the Soviet zone. Portisch wrote that Moscow intervened to defuse the situation and denied support to Austrian Communist.〔Williams, pp. 133-134.〕
抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』
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